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The eurozone’s double-dip recession is entirely self-made.
by Blog Admin
This month the eurozone returned to recession, three years after it emerged from the deep
recession of 2008-09. Paul De Grauwe argues that the current situation has been
produced by policy failures at the beginning of the crisis. The best initial policy would have
been for the eurozone’s creditor countries to increase spending, while the struggling
periphery countries implemented austerity measures. The budget-balancing policies of
creditor countries have instead created an asymmetric adjustment process in which most of
the adjustment has been carried by debtor countries such as Spain, Greece and Ireland.
One mechanism for returning the eurozone to growth may be for states such as Germany,
Finland and the Netherlands to maintain small budget deficits while keeping a constant debt to GDP ratio.
The risk of  a double-dip recession in the eurozone had been increasing during the last f ew months.
Figure 1 shows the growth rate of  GDP in the eurozone. It can be seen that af ter a recovery f rom the
deep recession of  2008-09, the eurozone’s GDP growth has been turning again into negative territory
since the second part of  2012.
The renewed decline in the growth rates of  GDP in the eurozone has the ef f ect of  automatically
increasing government budget def icits and putting pressure on national governments to avoid an
increase in these def icits. As a result, f iscal policies are tightened even f urther. The risk is that pro-
cyclical budgetary policies will push GDP growth rates in 2013 f irmer into negative territory, exacerbating
the current recession. The asymmetric structure of  macroeconomic adjustments in the eurozone has led
it towards this situation. A more symmetric approach of  adjustment may be a way to avoid it.
Figure 1
Source: European Commission, AMECO.
Asymmetries in macroeconomic adjustments in the eurozone
It is no exaggeration to state that macroeconomic policies in the eurozone have been driven by
sentiments in f inancial markets. Some countries (mainly the southern European countries) have been
pushed into bad equilibria characterised by high interest rates and intense pressures to redress budget
def icits by intense austerity programmes. Other countries (mainly northern European countries) have
gently been pushed into good equilibia, characterised by historically low interest rates and the relative
comf ort that can be derived f rom them. The southern European countries (including Ireland) are also the
economies that have accumulated current account def icits, while the northern European countries have
built up current account surpluses.
The best init ial policy would have been f or the debtor countries to reduce and f or the creditor countries
to increase spending. Instead, under the leadership of  the European Commission, t ight austerity was
imposed on the debtor countries while the creditor countries continued to f ollow policies aimed at
balancing the budget. This has led to an asymmetric adjustment process in which most of  the adjustment
has been done by the debtor nations. The latter countries have been f orced to reduce wages and prices
relative to the creditor countries (an ‘internal devaluation’) without compensating wage and price
increases in the creditor countries (‘internal revaluations’). Figures 2 and 3 graphically illustrate these
trends. 
Figure 2. Relative unit  labour costs in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland
Source: European Commission, AMECO.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of  the relative unit labour costs of  the peripheral debtor countries (where
we use the average over the 1970-2010 period as the base period). Two f eatures stand out. First, f rom
1999 until 2008-09, one observes the strong deterioration of  these countries’ relative unit labour costs.
Second, since 2008-09, quite dramatic turnarounds of  the relative unit labour costs have occurred
(internal devaluations) in Ireland, Spain and Greece, and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Italy.
These internal devaluations have come at a great cost in terms of  lost output and employment in the
debtor countries. As these internal devaluations are not yet completed (except possibly in Ireland), more
losses in output and employment are to be expected.
Is there evidence that such a process of  internal revaluations is going on in the surplus countries? The
answer is given in Figure 3, which presents the evolution of  the relative unit labour costs in the creditor
countries. We observe that since 2008-09, there is very litt le movement in these relative unit labour costs
in these countries. The posit ion of  Germany stands out. During 1999-2007, Germany engineered a
signif icant internal devaluation that contributed to its economic recovery and the build-up of  external
surpluses. This internal devaluation stopped in 2007-08. Since then no signif icant internal revaluation
has taken place in Germany. We also observe f rom Figure 3 that the other countries remain close to the
long run equilibrium (the average over 1970-2010) and that no signif icant changes have taken place since
2008-09. 
Figure 3. Relative unit  labour costs in Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, France, Finland and
Germany
Source: European Commission, Ameco.
Figure 4 shows a similar asymmetry in the adjustment process of  current account imbalances. We show
the current account posit ions of  the surplus and def icit countries. We observe the signif icant
deterioration of  the current account posit ion of  the def icit countries during the ‘bubble years’ f ollowed by
an equally signif icant improvement in the current account posit ion. No such movements are observed in
the surplus countries leading to the conclusion that most of  the adjustment in the external imbalances
within the eurozone has been made by the peripheral def icit countries. From the preceding analysis, one
can conclude that the burden of  the adjustments to the imbalances in the eurozone between the surplus
and the def icit countries is borne almost exclusively by the def icit countries in the periphery. This
asymmetry produces a def lationary bias in the eurozone as a whole. Yet it could be done dif f erently. A
more symmetric macroeconomic policy that reduces the def lationary bias can be implemented.
Figure 4
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How to recover from the double-dip recession 
A symmetric approach should start f rom the dif f erent f iscal posit ions of  the member countries of  the
eurozone. This dif f erence is shown in Figures 5 and 6, which present the government debt ratios of  two
groups of  countries in the eurozone, the debtor and the creditor countries. One observes f rom these
f igures that while the debtor countries have not been able to stabilise their government debt ratios (in
f act, these are still on an explosive path), the situation of  the creditor countries is dramatically dif f erent.
With the exception of  France, the latter set of  countries has managed to stabilise these ratios. This
opens a window of  opportunity to introduce a rule that can contribute to more symmetry in the
macroeconomic policies in the eurozone.
Here is the proposed rule. The creditor countries that have stabilised their debt ratios should stop trying
to reduce their budget def icits f urther now that the eurozone is entering a double-dip recession. Instead
they should stabilise their government debt ratios at the levels they have achieved in 2012. The
implication of  such a rule is that these countries can run small budget def icits and yet keep their
government debt levels constant. Germany, in particular, which today has almost achieved a balanced
budget, could increase its budget def icit to close to 3 per cent while keeping its ratio of  debt to GDP
constant. Other creditor countries – Belgium, Netherlands, Finland and Austria – could be urged to stop
adding new austerity measures without leading to an increase in their debt- to-GDP ratios.
Whether such a rule will be implemented very much depends on the European Commission. The latter
should invoke exceptional circumstances: i.e. the start of  a recession that is hitt ing the whole eurozone
and threatens to undermine the stability of  the currency area, and urge the creditor countries to
temporarily stop trying to balance their budgets. As an alternative rule, the European Commission should
convince the creditor countries that it is in both their and the eurozone’s interest that they stabilise their
government debt ratios instead.
The more symmetric budgetary policies advocated here would go some way toward reducing the
def lationary bias that has been instilled in the macroeconomic policies pursued in the eurozone since the
start of  the debt crisis, and which have pushed the eurozone into a double-dip recession.
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